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Executive Summary
As the North Korean threat has grown, so has the case for greater cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Observers have noted, and in
some cases bemoaned, the lingering historical hostility that prevents
more robust cooperation. Despite the emphasis on their historical differences, both countries share a tragic experience: the abduction of
nationals by the North Korean regime. Unfortunately, the issue has not
promoted common purpose and resolve. Instead, the failure to coordinate on this issue has hindered diplomacy without enhancing the
chances of a resolution to this tragic issue. By increasing governmental
and civic cooperation, Japan and South Korea as well as the U.S. can build
trust, deepen ties, and recognize common values while at the same time
enhancing the effectiveness of their diplomacy.
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Introduction
With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (hereafter North Korea)
fifth nuclear test in 2016 and ongoing missile development, the case for a
coordinated policy response is stronger than ever. These developments
pose the most direct threat to the Republic of Korea (hereafter South
Korea), Japan, and the U.S., and accordingly the countries have moved,
albeit slowly, toward greater strategic cooperation. One impediment to
cooperation though has been the fraught relationship between Japan
and South Korea, which continue to grapple with lingering historical
animosities relating to Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula. Yet
despite a recent low point in their relationship,1 both Japanese and South
Korean leaders increasingly realize the importance of increased cooperation, as witnessed by the signing of a new bilateral intelligence agreement
in November 2016.
To cultivate deeper cooperation, this paper suggests that both South
Korea and Japan take measures to coordinate around another issue
common to both countries: addressing the abduction of their nationals
by the North Korean regime. Thus far, both countries have largely taken
a go-it-alone approach to resolving this problem. Weak coordination
has allowed the North Korean government to exploit the issue to its
advantage, which at times has complicated diplomacy (such as during the
Six-Party Talks discussed below) while producing few tangible results.
Rather than going it alone, both Japan and South Korea would benefit
from closer cooperation on the issue. Working together would highlight
their common interest in dealing with the human rights violations of
the North Korean regime, which would enhance trust among elites and
the public of both countries. By focusing on the issue as one common
to both countries, international cooperation could distance the issue,
which has broad resonance in Japan, from the right wing and fringe
anti-Korean sentiment. Lastly, while a full resolution is arguably unlikely,
closer coordination on the issue is more likely to produce better results
and enhance the ability of the U.S., South Korea and Japan to address
broader strategic objectives.
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A Shared Tragedy: Abductions in
South Korea and Japan
North Korea has kidnapped thousands of citizens of other countries
since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The regime had a range of
apparent motives, including acquiring foreign identities for their spies,
instructing North Koreans in foreign languages, and for use in propaganda. Of these, the largest number of abductees—estimated to be near
four thousand—was from South Korea. The majority of those abducted
were returned to South Korea, several escaped, but 516 of them are still
missing. How many are still alive is unclear. The Japanese government’s
official estimate of the number of its abductees is seventeen, the second
highest number of abductees. Of these, North Korea claims eight are
dead. The remaining five returned to Japan in 2002, and later five of their
children were brought to Japan as well.2

South Korea
In South Korea, its abductees emerged as a political issue in the late
1990s. In 1998, one abductee escaped and returned to South Korea,
increasing the visibility of their plight. As momentum grew around this
issue, families of abductees and their supporters began to seek redress,
not only for the abductions, but also for the discrimination that many
family members of abductees faced as a result of suspected communist
sympathies.3 Advocacy groups pressed the government to do more to
resolve the issue of the abductees, and in 2011, the government established
the Abductees Committee headed by the Vice-Minister of Unification.
Still, the issue of abductees has been far less prominent than in Japan
due to other major unresolved issues, including POWs remaining in the
North from the Korean War (1950 to 1953) and over 100,000 families that
remain separated from the division of the Korean Peninsula. Prior to the
second North-South Summit in 2007, one poll asked South Koreans to list
the top priority for the summit, revealing that abductions were perceived
to be the lowest priority - nuclear weapons was the top priority followed
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by easing military tension. 4 The government has subordinated the issue
to other larger foreign policy priorities, such as former President Kim
Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, to improve inter-Korean relations and more
recently, pressuring North Korea to end provocations and its nuclear
program. The South Korean government though has used the UN to
raise awareness about the abductee issue and other North Korean human
rights abuses.

Japan
The Japanese government’s approach to the abductee issue has been
driven by domestic politics. The issue of abductees came into full public
view in 2002 when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang as a step
toward normalization. During this historic visit, Kim Jong Il acknowledged and expressed remorse to Koizumi that North Korea had abducted
thirteen Japanese nationals, reporting that five were still alive and eight
had died. There had long been suspicions of abductions, but the spontaneous revelation sparked a public backlash, which ultimately led to the
derailment of normalization talks.
In the aftermath of the revelation, the outrage increased when the
evidence provided by North Korea to verify the deaths proved dubious.5
In contrast to South Korea, the issue of abductees rose to the top of the
political agenda. Indeed, a poll right after the 2002 Pyongyang Summit
showed that the Japanese had much greater interest in the abductee
issue than North Korea’s nuclear program, a pattern that has persisted
in subsequent years.6 Shinzo Abe, who as Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet
Secretary had openly broken ranks with him over the issue, rose to
power in 2006 in part by taking a hard-line stance. Prime Minister
Abe declared that the issue of abductions was “the most important
problem our country faces” and then formed The Headquarters on the
Abduction Issue, which he personally chaired.7 Upon coming back to
power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Abe promised resolution of
the issue during his tenure in office.
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Since the official acknowledgement that North Korea had kidnapped
Japanese citizens, the Japanese government has taken a variety of measures—including a series of carrots and sticks—to seek a resolution to
the issue. The Japanese government has held out normalization and
the promise of aid to entice the North Korean regime into a satisfactory resolution. It has also employed unilateral sanctions against North
Korea and advocated at different times for a widening of sanctions. The
Japanese government has also used other multilateral fora to advance
its case, including the UN.

Why Broader Coordination is Needed
Thus far, there has been limited cooperation on the issue of the abductees,
and at times, the governments of South Korea, Japan and the U.S. have
been at odds. There are good reasons though that these countries, in
particular Japan and South Korea, should pursue enhanced cooperation.
First, the lack of cooperation hinders diplomatic coordination. From
2003 to 2008, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the
U.S. held the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear program.
During these negotiations, the failure to coordinate positions on the
abductee issue created opportunities for North Korea to create a wedge
between natural allies—the U.S., South Korea and Japan. The Japanese
side understandably pushed for a resolution of the abduction issue, but
North Korea used the issue to isolate Japan. The Japanese government
refused to provide aid as part of a deal for denuclearization, but the
other parties went forward with the deal. Tension between the U.S. and
Japan also emerged when the U.S. dropped North Korea from a list of
state sponsors of terror, despite previous indication that delisting North
Korea would be contingent on progress on the abductee issue.8
Despite this experience, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have yet to
figure out an effective way both to address the issue of abductees and
pursue a coordinated approach to North Korea. The Japanese side,
even under the hawkish current Prime Minister Abe, has pursued an
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independent approach focused on normalization and the settlement
of the abductee issue. As recently as May 2014, the Abe government
lifted some sanctions, although sanctions were stiffened in the wake
of additional nuclear tests. At times, these negotiations have surprised
both South Korea and the U.S. When Prime Minister Abe sent a special
adviser to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue, neither
the South Korean nor the U.S. governments had received notification.
Indeed, one South Korean official described the move as “not helpful”
and urged a united front between all three countries.9
Second, it is unlikely that the lack of coordination is likely to have an
upside. From the perspective of the Japanese government and people,
one can fully appreciate the desire to settle this painful issue. It is also
not surprising that the Japanese government has pursued an independent
policy to seek a resolution; indeed, the U.S. has not always been as sympathetic to the Japanese side or fully appreciated the domestic pressure
on the government to do something about it. Yet at the same time, the
prospects of Japan successfully resolving this issue bilaterally are quite
dim. On the one hand, even if North Korea made a good faith effort to
normalize relations, Japan faces constraints in terms of the carrot that
it might offer. Restoring trade relations and providing aid would come
up against Japanese security interests in pressuring the North Korean
regime to slow or freeze its nuclear and missile development. On the
other hand, there is little strategic incentive for North Korea to negotiate
in good faith to resolve the issue given its utility as an issue that it can
manipulate to its advantage.
Third, by failing to coordinate, Japan and South Korea are missing an
opportunity to build trust and articulate a common interest amongst
themselves. Despite the fact that both South Korean and Japanese nationals have been abducted, the issue has provided little sense of solidarity.
In fact, in some ways the abductions have undermined goodwill between
the countries. In Japan, there is widespread outrage toward North Korea,
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but elements of the right wing—such as the activist group National
Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea—have
exploited this issue. The kidnappings have also fed fringe anti-Korean
sentiment in Japan.10 Protestors have publicly directed hate speech
and threats toward Koreans, a development that damages the image of
Japanese among South Koreans.

A Path Forward
There are two areas where cooperation can be enhanced. First, the government and civic groups should emphasize the common plight of the
victims in Japan and South Korea. South Korea has more abductees, but
the issue has been a relatively low priority. In Japan the issue has largely
been framed as a Japanese-specific tragedy. Steps to emphasize a shared
experience can raise the visibility of the issue in South Korea. Such
measures may increase South Korean awareness of the broad resonance
of the issue in Japan and increase recognition that it is more than just
a rallying cry for the right wing. Cross-national cooperation could also
help dilute the influence of right wing and fringe anti-Korean protesters
in shaping the narrative in Japan.
Second, regular dialogues should be held to foster cooperation on the
abductee issue. Given different priorities and varying democratic pressures, there are limitations to the extent to which policies can be aligned.
Still, bilateral meetings between South Korea and Japan can provide an
opportunity to share information, discuss standards for what would
constitute a satisfactory North Korean response, and coordinate policy
responses so as to avoid surprises or limit opportunities for North Korea
exploitation. Trilateral dialogue with the U.S. also would improve coordination of policy responses. Regular meetings might add consistency
to the United States’ messaging to its partners and also help avoid policy
shifts that undermine trust. n
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